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The biography of a living philosopher is always of interest, as it gives rise to 
interpretations that seek the developmental necessity that has led to the 
publication of his or her latest ideas. This concept of development however is 
problematic, especially with a thinker such as Bernard Stiegler, whose work 
on technology is a sustained critique of the logic of dialectical necessity. And 
yet there remains a sense in which the totality of a philosopher’s work is the 
essential question that concerns his or her expositors: and so the purpose of 
my paper is to present the evolution of a certain idea of reflexive freedom in 
Stiegler’s Technics and Time, and to show how this is related to the concept 
of pharmacology which is developed in his most recent works, particularly 
What Makes Life Worth Living: On Pharmacology and For A New Critique of 
Political Economy. The central themes of my exposition are the originary 
technicity thesis set out in volume one of Technics and Time, the informatic 
reduction of memory whose effects are presented in volume two, and the 
configurations of time, community, and spirit that are the basis of Stiegler’s 
latest work on the politics of prosthetic life. My paper will begin by examining 
concept of the pharmakon which is developed in Derrida’s essay Plato’s 
Pharmacy, as it is here that the idea of a medium that is simultaneously 
poisonous and therapeutic is developed in relation to the discursive affects of 
writing. I will then go on to look at Stiegler’s attempt to reconfigure the 
‘orthographic economy’ of deconstruction, particularly his account of the how 
the ‘tertiary supports’ of virtual and information technologies have transformed 
the experience of the real in the regime of biopolitical capitalism. Finally, I will 
argue that the appearance of the pharmakon as a matrix idea in his work, 
sharpens the aporia of technological society: for the impossibility of human 
culture’s being reduced either to the disorientated life of industrial populism, or 
to idealist notions of reflexivity, is what, for Stiegler, offers the chance of a 














The Politics of Spirit in Stiegler’s Techno-Pharmacology 
 
‘What constativity of the who can still be envisaged - and what must be 
envisaged’ 
- Bernard Stiegler, Technics and Time, 2 
 
Introduction 
The ancient Greek word pharmakon, as Derrida pointed out in his essay 
Plato’s Pharmacy, has been passed down as a signifier with a number of 
different meanings: ‘poison’, ‘drug’, ‘remedy’, ‘potion’, ‘philtre’ etc. Derrida’s 
reading of Plato in this essay is a sustained interrogation of the relationship 
between thinking and writing presented in the Phaedrus. He argues that the 
concept of anamnesis that Plato expounded as the spontaneous movement of 
thought within its own essential medium, is a fantasy, and that every act of 
knowing, memory, and recognition depends upon the supplementary 
economy of inscription. The spontaneity of thought can never free itself from 
the utilitarian economy the written word; and so its very possibility depends 
upon the tropes and metaphors through which writing seeks to determine the 
substance of the real. Thus, for Derrida, Plato’s designation of writing as a 
pharmakon reveals the fundamental ambiguity that is held within the term; the 
‘poison’ of writing is also the ‘remedy’ for its dissemination of difference and 
dissent, that is, the possibility of unforeseen affects of recognition and 
community (Derrida, 1981: 95-96). This question of the primordial ambiguity is 
taken up in Barnard Stiegler’s later work, particularly What Makes Life Worth 
Living: On Pharmacology and For a New Critique of Political Economy. In 
both of these books he seeks to develop the idea of the pharmakon beyond 
what he conceives as the ‘orthographic economy’ of Derrida’s concept of the 
grammè: he attempts to show that the grammatization of the real (its 
constitution through processes of rupture, deferral, and dissemination) has 
become a function of the virtual and onto-technological programmes through 
which life, in its entirety, has been encoded. Stiegler’s pharmakon therefore is 
the totality of the interfaces between the human and the technological; it is the 
antagonism between the toxic reduction of life to capitalized desire, and the 
expressive forms of cathexis (love, spirit) that have been made possible by 
the techno-hybridization of human beings.  
My intention in what follows is to consider the ‘new critique’ of political 
economy that emerges from Stiegler’s account of the pharmakon. In the 
introduction to What Makes Life Worth Living he remarks that:  
The pharmakon is at once what enables care to be taken and that 
of which care must be taken - the sense that it is necessary to pay 
attention: its power is curative to the immeasurable extent . . . that it 
is also destructive (Stiegler, 2013: 4, author’s italics).  
The chance of interrupting the cycle of production-desire-consumption that 
determines the inequalities of the global economy depends therefore, on 
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developing a critique of the relationship between capital and the technological 
supplementation of human beings. The groundwork for this project dates from   
Stiegler’s account of the originary relationship between technology and the 
constitution of the human in volume one of Technics and Time. In essence, his 
argument is that there is no ‘first origin’ of human beings that predates the 
deployment of tools: we become ‘human’ through the cognitive-noetic 
capacities that develop in relation to the manipulation of the first primitive 
instruments (napped stone tools and weapons). This relationship is what gives 
human beings to their fate; all that they have become, in terms of their control 
of nature, production of commodities, and capitalization of life, is achieved 
through technological systems whose effects remain potentially catastrophic. 
Technology is, from the beginning, pharmacological; its organizational 
structures determine a relative autonomy from the symbolic culture of human 
life, and, as such, retain the power to disrupt both the implicit order of nature 
and the sense of moral solidarity (Stiegler, 1998: 198-200). However, it is the 
experience of this disruption that also maintains the ‘sublime possibility’ of 
spirit; for as the technological programmes through which humanity is 
capitalized begin to be experienced as suffering and hopelessness, so the 
energy of the soul is provoked into acts of self-expression that disrupt the 
decadence of mass desire (Stiegler, 2011: 17-18). 
The question that is addressed in Stiegler’s later work therefore is that of the 
effectiveness of this pharmacological spirit. Or, to put it slightly differently, how 
can the unforeseen recuperation of a desire for the infinite (love, cathexis, 
community) become the basis of a regeneration of social, economic, and 
political life? In For a New Critique of Political Economy Stiegler maintains that 
the continued existence of the commodity form is dependent upon three 
related factors: the development of virtual and information technologies, the 
expansion of the knowledge economy, and the constant transformation and re-
encoding of desire (Stiegler, 2010: 3-13). Human individuals, in other words, 
are differentiated through a system in which their capacity for noesis is 
reduced to almost nothing; the libidinal structure of the ego is channeled 
directly into the utilitarian cycle of production-consumption, and the capacity 
for reflective self-determination is all but lost. In section two therefore I will 
examine the pharmacology of this regime, or what we might call the economy 
of spirit that is also put into play by the networks of biopolitical capitalism. The 
transformative potential of this economy is to be found in the strange and 
provocative conjunction of Freud, Nietzsche, and Heidegger that is sketched in 
Stiegler’s later writing. And so in the final section of the paper, I will show how 
the expansion of the technological pharmakon has led to a crisis in which the 
absolute limits of capitalization have been reached, and how the ensuing 
radicalization of being has transformed the affective freedom of the human 
soul. 
Such an attempt to re-engage with the concept of spirit inevitably provokes 
certain ‘Marxist’ objections, in which the growing inequality between Third and 
First Worlds, the emergence vast underclasses in industrial democracies, and 
the resurgence of neo-colonial domination, are conceived as repeating the 
systemic decline that Marx identified as the historical tendency of capitalism 
(Marx, 1990: 927-930). These questions are, of course, entirely legitimate; for 
they express a demand to show what Stiegler’s detour into the sublime 
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creativity of spirit might add to our understanding of the political economy of 
globalization. In what follows, I will show that his later work is, in essence, an 
attempt to sketch a universal fate that has arisen from what he calls the 
‘proletarianization’ of human life (Stiegler, 2013: 15-17; Stiegler, 2010: 14-44). 
His claim is that the global economy is really the spread of a particular regime 
of technologically intensified desire, and that consequently we should 
understand the massive inequalities that are generated by international trade, 
as the outcome of pathologically disordered forms of libido. This desire 
constantly to consume more, to have more, and to be more is not confined to 
financial speculators or to the ranks of ‘the bourgeoisie’; it has become the 
constitutive element of global exchange, the constantly recreated potential for 
thoughtless excess that has taken root in even every class and every 
economy. And so if we are to understand the political implications of 
globalization, and to retain a certain fidelity to Marx’s critique of capital, we 
need to grasp the crises of subjectivity (spirit) that biopolitical capitalism has 
caused in industrial democracies, and the conflicts to which the forced 
exportation of this regime have given rise. In the sections that follow I will 
examine Stiegler’s attempt to sketch the chance of a new politics of spirit that 
has emerged from the global pharmacology of the commodity form.     
 
Culture, Technicity and the ‘Default of Being’    
I will begin by looking at the logic of Stiegler’s originary technicity thesis as it 
is presented in section one of Technics and Time, 1, ‘The Invention of the 
Human’. His argument is that if we relinquish the idea of human beings having 
been brought into existence by a unique act of divine creation, the 
responsibility of the speculative anthropologist becomes that of accounting for 
the emergence of Homo sapiens from the evolutionary mechanism of nature. 
We must begin not with speculations about the original essence of man (á la 
Rousseau), but with an analytical taxonomy of the species from which human 
beings are descended (Stiegler, 1998: 132). Stiegler’s argument, which draws 
extensively on Leroi-Gourhan’s Gesture and Speech, is that the evolution of 
the simians to which Darwin traced the origins of humanity, should be 
understood in relation to the material adaptations that arose from the use of 
tools. Over the course of time, the manipulation of sticks and stones in the 
forepaws of a certain pre-simian species, gave rise to modes of cooperative 
organization that proved advantageous in the evolutionary struggle. For 
Stiegler, the crucial effect of such habituated tool manipulation is the skeletal-
physiological modifications that emerged in certain species: paws gradually 
developed into the proto hands and feet that eventually produced the upright 
carriage of the great apes (Stiegler, 1998: 139-145). What is crucial here is 
the development of the ‘anterior field’, or the specific orientation of simians 
towards interaction based on gestures, utterances, and facial expressions that 
arose from their technical coordination of practical activity (Leroi-Gourhan, 
1993: 31-36). It is this simian culture that gave rise to the conflict and 
cooperation that determined the evolutionary history of the primate family; and 
so the success of the first hominid species, Zinjanthropus, was the outcome of 
their ability to utilize the brittle edge of flint stones in the collective 
organization of work, conflict, and exchange.    
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According to Stiegler Zinjanthropus is human - despite the fact that it lacked 
an articulate language. This idea of the inception of the human before 
language is crucial to Stiegler’s account of originary technicity, and so we 
need carefully to examine the logic of his argument. The fashioning of tools 
(as hunting implements, weapons, inscriptive instruments) means that 
Zinjanthropus’ temporal orientation is qualitatively different from all other 
species; for the manipulation of primitive instruments gives rise to a form of 
memory that is directly inscribed in the activity of collective life. The fashioning 
of flint, in other words, marks the emergence of a culture in which the 
manipulation of tools places each ‘one’ within a temporal continuum: to use a 
tool is to remember how it was made, how it has been deployed, and, 
crucially, how it can be modified (Stiegler, 1998: 150-54). This has certain 
‘Heideggerian’ consequences: for according to Stiegler, the emergence of 
self-consciousness in relation to the technological support of the tool, is what 
gives rise to the temporal horizon of finitude that is constitutive of Dasein.   
Zinjanthropus is the beginning of human history; it is the species through 
which culture emerges as a mediation of the sense of mortality that 
accompanies the instrumental power of the tool. This ‘primal scene’ however 
is given no theological or teleological significance in Stiegler’s analysis: it 
simply begs the question of the relationship between ‘organized inorganic 
matter’ (nature), the neurological development of the human brain, and the 
evolution of the tool as mediator between self-consciousness and the 
plasticity of the world. Stiegler, in a way that recalls Nietzsche’s account of the 
formation of man in The Genealogy of Morals, maintains that what happens at 
the beginning of human history opens up certain evolutionary possibilities, 
each of which gives rise to unforeseen configurations of power, resistance, 
and overcoming. And so his account of the evolution of Zinjanthropus, and of 
the emergence of Neanthropus as the species in which tool manipulation 
becomes the condition of cortical development, is presented as a possibility 
whose realization has come about through innumerable conflicts and 
adaptations in humanity’s techno-social being (Nietzsche, 1990: 189-230; 
Stiegler, 1998: 192-96).    
According to Stiegler, the emergence of Homo sapiens marks the point at 
which the organic structure of the brain is set and human society becomes 
essentially technological in its trajectory. It is Neanthropean sociality that 
opens the possibility of this transformation: for the instrumental handling of 
nature (physis) gives rise to the symbolic mediations of biological necessity, 
social life, and individual experience that are the most basic functions of 
culture. Thus, the originary technicity of human beings is what underlies the 
history of inscription through which ‘ethnic community’ is constituted in 
primitive societies. It is this process that Stiegler refers to as the 
‘epiphylogenetic’ origin of memory: the re-transmission of a historical 
experience of community (cathexis, pathos) within technological programmes 
of exchange and integration (Stiegler, 1998: 175-177).    
This relationship of humanity to the instruments of its evolution is traced in 
Stiegler’s reading of the myth of Prometheus. According to the myth Zeus 
created all animal species as beings without essence, and left the job of 
distributing powers of speed, intelligence, and strength to Prometheus. 
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However, Prometheus was persuaded by his brother Epimetheus to allow him 
to complete the task of distributing powers to the different species. When 
Zeus returned, Epimetheus, who lacked his brother’s intelligence, had 
forgotten to give humanity any defining attributes; and so human beings were 
thrown into the world naked and without the means of survival. The suffering 
of this ‘forgotten species’ moved Prometheus to steal the means of making 
fire from the gods, and to bestow the gift of this technology upon humanity. 
The fate bestowed by this ‘gift’ however is a tragic one (Hesiod, 2008: 37-40; 
Plato, 1961: 320-322). Promethean innovation, through which humanity is 
bound to the unforeseen effects of technology, is the perpetual imminence of 
disaster: and it is this which gives rise to the basic structure of ‘being with’ 
(sociality) that Stiegler calls epimetheia, or the anticipation of catastrophe that 
is touched with the hope that human spirit may yet be sufficient to save the 
day (Stiegler, 1998: 184). Thus, if there is a distinctively Stieglerian approach 
to technology, it is to register the ambivalence of its relationship to humanity’s 
default of essence, that is, the simultaneously toxic and therapeutic 
supplementation of life which is the milieu of human freedom (Stiegler, 1998: 
177-179; Stiegler, 2013: 1-5).  
In the second volume of Technics and Time, Stiegler’s concern with human 
freedom and community is focused on the fate of reflection (noesis) in the 
highly commodified information markets that have come to dominate the 
global economy. In the orthographic regime, whose techniques of inscription 
predate the virtual encoding of life, individual experience is constituted 
through a dialectical relationship between intuition, synthesis, and cultural 
memory. Thus, what is threatened in the informatic model of exchange is the 
end of what Hegel called Bildung, or the reflective aspect of a culture whose 
means of transmission, the letter, is the support of collective memory 1. In 
contemporary informatic societies this relationship to the past is increasingly 
threatened. For as events are dispersed through virtual technologies that 
determine their capital as news, information, risk, or financial opportunity, so 
the possibility of their being re-cast through dialectical reflection is all but 
erased. The ‘tertiary supports’ of experience (virtual machines) supply 
commentaries and images that allow no exegetical work: human beings 
experience the effects of global informatic exchange (wars, cultural and 
religious conflicts, social and economic dislocations) as the unfolding of a 
spontaneous history in which they figure only as complicit bystanders 
(Stiegler, 2009a: 118-122). To cite an example germane to Stiegler’s concern 
with the intergenerational transmission of knowledge as savior vivre, the 
coverage of the student demonstrations in 2011 gave formulaic accounts of 
young middle class radicals with nothing better to do, rather than relating their 
protests to the consequences of austerity for the right to a philosophical or 
historical education (Stiegler, 2013: 132-133).   
According to Heidegger, technological modernity reveals a weakness of 
humanity for thoughtless repetition; for even the events of ‘Nietzschean’ 
excess that supposedly threaten the substance of ethical life, reveal 
themselves as expressions of a desire that has been unable to penetrate to 
the origins of its egoity (Heidegger, 1991: 150-158). In his account of the 
industrialization of memory, Stiegler reconfigures this Heideggerian approach 
to the constitution of egoistic desire: for his theory of the externalizing power 
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of representative technologies points towards a displacement of Heidegger’s 
fundamental ontology, and of the essentialist constructions (of ‘man’, ‘spirit’, 
and ‘community’) to which it has given rise. Thus, the prosthetic constitution of 
Dasein which Stiegler expounds in Technics and Time marks a transformation 
of the political problematic of modernity: for insofar as human self-
consciousness is given through the technological instability of ethical life, the 
experience of non-identity (spirit) is always re-traced in the psychical 
individuation of the subject. As we will see, Steigler’s latest work (2013: 109-
110; 2010: 116-117) maintains that the chance of there being a reflective 
presence which is akin to the one Heidegger called Dasein, depends on 
media (virtual and communications technologies) whose affects are played 
out in the libidinal pulsions of life itself: love, difference, and mortality.  
It is important to note at this point the debt that Stiegler’s theory of the fate of 
orthographic culture owes to Gilbert Simondon’s work on the evolution of 
technological objects. For Simondon the mode of existence of such objects is 
characterized by the process of ‘concretization’: the practical design of 
technological assemblages gives rise to new forms of synergy, coherence, and 
internal resonance whose telos is the progressive integration of external 
limitations and contingent environmental factors. The teleology that comes into 
being with these assemblages is enacted through the inventor: the individual 
through which the ‘superabundant efficacy’ of machines is realized in new 
assemblages and theoretical possibilities (Simondon quoted in Chabot, 2003: 
15). The process of structural concretization therefore, carries the possibility of 
a ‘we’ that is constituted in the processes of synergy and coordination through 
which the technological environment develops. Indeed, Simondon’s demand 
for a philosophy of technology is, in essence, a demand for a public 
awareness of the possibilities (of degradation and reconstitution) that have 
been opened by the evolution of technological objects. This is close to 
Stiegler’s account of the relationship between cultural and technological 
programmes, insofar as Simondon’s philosophy maintains that noetic 
possibilities arise from the constantly expanding functionality of machines. 
However, Stiegler’s work has always insisted on a far more profound 
disturbance of human subjectivity by technological prosthesis than Simondon’s 
work is able to acknowledge. In a recent article he claimed that Simondon’s 
thought tends toward kind of ‘mechanology’ that seeks to ‘situate the human 
conductor of an orchestra of cybernetic machines’ (2009b: 54-55). There is, in 
other words, a metaphysical concept of ‘pre-individuation’ that haunts his 
account of technological systems, and which is the basis of a noetic 
community that should stand watch over the influence of machines on the 
order of human life.  
Thus, if the developing relationship between capital and virtual technologies 
has given rise to experiences of corporeal displacement, psychical 
disorientation, and multiple connection that bear directly on humanity’s mode 
of being in the world, then the originality of Stiegler’s project lies in his 
reformulation of the experience of indeterminacy that is the essence of the 
Heideggerian concept of Dasein. In the following sections I will examine 
Stiegler’s re-readings of Marx, Heidegger, Freud, and Derrida on the 
technological transformation of ethical life, and how his account of the 
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pharmakon configures the chance of ‘quantum leap’ beyond the economy of 
hopeless, entropic consumption (Stiegler, 2009b: 47-48).    
 
The ‘Who’ and the ‘What’ of the Information Society 
 
Let me begin with a conjecture that Stiegler presents in Technics and Time, 2 
as part of his exposition of the industrialization of memory (Stiegler, 2009a: 
152-53). The conjecture is Marvin Minsky’s, and is set out in his article ‘The 
Future Merging of Science, Art, and Psychology’. Minsky’s idea is that the 
development of cybernetics, information technology, and neuroscience has 
opened up a singular possibility: that in the near future it will be possible for 
the human brain to transmit its intentions outside of its organic milieu (the 
body), and to have them translated into actions performed in virtual 
environments or by robotic devices in the ‘real world’. The relationship 
described here is fundamentally transgressive: for as the activity of the brain 
is channeled directly into media that process, interpret, and transmit its 
intentionality, so the will, desire, and affective satisfactions of the human 
organism are transformed by the artificial assemblage through which it acts 
(Minsky, 1993: 93-95). As the informatic power of the assemblage is 
increased, so the relationship between mind and machine, the ‘who’ and the 
‘what’, becomes fluid; the machine anticipates ‘organic’ desire, and 
disseminates it across networks in which relations of domination and 
servitude never fully crystallize. Thus, the very nature of human intelligence is 
transformed: it is taken up in a technological system that is without organic 
restriction, and which gives rise to innovations that constantly transform 
humanity’s experience of being in the world.  
 
Minsky’s conjecture was made in 1993, and it is now the case that the 
connection between the human and the technological has evolved in the 
direction he predicted. Information-processing technologies are capable of 
connecting directly with neurological centres of intention: for example, 
interfaces have been developed that allow human beings to steer robotic 
vehicles, and to act in virtual environments, through remote acts of will (Leeb 
et al, 2012). For Stiegler, the significance of these developments lies in the 
fact that the orthographic supplementation of self-consciousness, which had 
supported the constitution of culture as a place of symbolic recognition, is 
fundamentally altered. As we have seen, the account of industrialized memory 
presented in Technics and Time, 2, attempts to show that self-reflection is 
forestalled by the encoding performed by media whose influence on the 
constitution of ‘free will’ becomes practically instantaneous. The technologies 
through which events are staged ‘for us’, in other words, are invisible; they 
have become a global interface that has all but erased its presence as the 
condition of memory and subjectivity. However, what saves Stiegler’s account 
of information technology from lapsing into the involution of Baudrillard’s 
hyperreality thesis - where the information network comes to ‘think us’ 2 - is 
his engagement with Heidegger’s account of the experience of technological 
enframing.  
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The hope contained in Stiegler’s work lies, I believe, close to Minsky’s idea of 
prosthesis, in which humanity is responsible to emergent possibilities of 
freedom and community that arise from the experience of technological 
transformation. This hope is articulated through a particular reading of 
Heidegger’s notion of Dasein, in which the experience of being in the world is 
conceived as originally prosthetic. The anxiety that for Heidegger constitutes 
Dasein’s ontological difference - the apprehension of its impending death - is 
conceived by Stiegler as the outcome of a reflexive awareness that is 
originally related to the practical supplementation of human life. The 
existential care that defines the experience of Dasein is a technological affect: 
humanity is thrown into a world in which its conflicts, responsibilities, and 
desires are simultaneous with the disorientation that technology brings to the 
symbolic milieu of culture. Thus, in Stiegler’s account of the industrialization of 
memory the chance of human freedom is sustained within the networks of the 
information economy; the responsibilities of this freedom emerge from 
spheres of necessity, risk, and domination that arise from the scientific 
perfectibility of life. So, to return to the Marxist problematic that is implicit in 
Stiegler’s thought: how are we to think the effect of this freedom on the total 
capitalization of the world?   
According to Stiegler, life, for human beings, has become responsibility to the 
affects of their technological fate; and so they must seek something 
‘constative’ in the remorseless technological transformation of their culture 
and individual being (2009a: 154). This, of course, has a Heideggerian ring to 
it, and Stiegler’s reading of ‘The Question Concerning Technology’ is marked 
by a degree of sympathy for Heidegger’s account of the techno-scientific 
enframing of Dasein. Despite this, the report on human freedom given in 
Technics and Time, 2, is a rejection of Heidegger’s gesture towards the 
revitalization of poïesis that occurs through the regime of Gestell. In the end, 
Stiegler shares Derrida’s suspicions about the economy of spirit that such a 
gesture is part of - an economy that solicits the violent return of essence 
(Volk, Heimat, Kultur) to the life of the nation. And yet there is a crucial 
difference between Derrida and Stiegler’s readings of Heidegger; a difference 
that is constitutive of their respective positions on the exercise of political 
freedom within the networks of global capital.  
The position Derrida sets out in Of Spirit is that Heidegger inherits the idea of 
Geist that emerges in his later writings, from the tragic determination of history 
presented in Hegel’s Phenomenology of Spirit. For Derrida, the Hegelian 
condensation of violence and death into the ethical life of the nation state 
takes place within an economy of orthographic culture: it brings with it the 
possibility of a mediation of life in which mutual recognition can defer the 
violence of essentialist cultures of race, nation, or religion. And so despite 
Derrida’s originary critiques of Hegel’s euro and phallocentrism, his account of 
Heidegger’s writing on the technological fate of modernity implies that 
Hegelian spirit is marked by a certain reserve in relation to redemptive 
essentialisms of the kind to which Heidegger ultimately has recourse. For 
Derrida, in other words, there is a hesitation in the recuperative movement of 
Hegelian spirit, a hesitation that is marked by a play of différance that always 
returns to the crystallization of abstract freedom into determinate forms of 
justice, sexuality, nature, and the law (1990a: 251-277; 1990b: 235). It is 
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Derrida’s contention that, in Heidegger’s later work, the grammè, whose 
differentiating contingency his early thought had radicalized, is thrown into an 
ontology that precipitates the question of freedom beyond the noetic culture of 
ethical life (1991: 99-113). It is here that Stiegler identifies a ‘Hegelian’ residue 
in Derrida’s reading of Heidegger; for his moral economy of différance 
assumes the persistence of an orthographic culture whose recuperative 
powers have been dispersed into the ontic programmes of the technological 
pharmakon (gene technologies, biomedical systems, virtual realities) (1998: 
198-202).  
So, where does this leave us in terms of the possibility of freedom, ethics, and 
community in the time of prosthetic memory? How are we to conceive this 
possibility after the appropriation of Dasein by the networks of biopolitical 
capitalism? For Stiegler, the economy of différance which opens the chance 
of politics and ethics should be understood as having been formed within 
specific technological programmes: the question of how I ought to respond to 
those who share my subjection to the regime of accelerated exchange, arises 
directly from that subjection as a form of technologically supplemented life. 
For Stiegler, the question of technological society should be approached 
through the experience of disorientation it produces: it is the question of a 
cultural mediation of time that returns through the dispersal and re-formation 
of ‘prosthetic’ human beings. Richard Beardsworth, in his article ‘Thinking 
Technicity’, maintains that the concept of spirit that is implicit in Stiegler’s 
Technics and Time, should be conceived in terms of a Nietzschean model in 
which body, mind, and psyche are radically transformed through techno-
scientific disseminations of energy (Beardsworth, 1998: 81-84). The ‘culture of 
spirit’ he takes to be the ethical horizon of Stiegler’s thought, in other words, 
has a remorselessly futural orientation, which, for me, is at odds with the 
concept of epiphylogenetic memory developed throughout Stiegler’s work on 
technics. Thus, if there is to be a politics of spirit that is effective within the 
networks of biopolitical production, this must come through recurrent, 
technologically transformed, traces of orthographic memory - for without such 
noetic reflection, the future is nothing more than the terminal crisis of mass 
desire (Stiegler, 2009a: 118-126; Virillio, 2006: 149-167).  
   
Conclusion: Stiegler’s Pharmacology 
We have seen that the operative demand of information society is constantly 
to increase the speed at which social and economic exchange takes place. 
The application of this principle threatens the end of free reflection, as self-
conscious human beings are taken into a system of techno-economic 
decadence in which individual desire is without memory or psychical 
connection (Stiegler, 2011: 1-13). It is this logic that transforms the being of 
Dasein, which is the improbable possibility of freedom that is distributed 
across the global networks of informatic exchange. Dasein’s default of 
essence, in other words, is the chance of a certain concept of spirit, which lies 
close to the idea of transformative reflection that Derrida expounds in his 
readings of Heidegger and Marx. In Technics and Time, Stiegler elaborates 
this idea through the impossibility of pure informatic materialism: for the fact 
that the technological integration of Dasein can never be accomplished 
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without psychical disorientation, means that the experience of spirit, as 
noesis, always returns to the systemic organization of social life.  
So, what kind of ethico-political agency could such a determination of spirit 
make possible within the systems of network society? It is this question that 
Stiegler addresses in his latest work, particularly What Makes Life Living: On 
Pharmacology and For a New Critique of Political Economy. The first of these 
begins with a reconfiguration of the originary technicity thesis, which presents 
the supplementation of human beings as a having a dual aspect in which their 
lack of essence is made good by a technological regime that is both toxic and 
therapeutic (Stiegler, 2013: 19-20). Stiegler, recalling Derrida’s argument in 
Plato’s Pharmacy, maintains that pure self-reflection of the soul (anamnesis) 
is impossible, as such reflection is always the outcome of techniques of 
transmission (writing, orthography) that constitute the grammatological 
economy of thinking (Derrida, 1993: 95-117). His version of Derrida’s 
argument however, extends its scope beyond the technical affects of writing: 
for the virtual machines that have transformed both the objective structure and 
subjective experience of the real, have radically altered the temporality of 
reflection and desire through which the experience of the social is constituted. 
The soul of the individual is penetrated by a pharmacological regime in which 
its drives are remorselessly intensified by flows of information and aesthetic 
simulacra (Stiegler, 2013: 116). This concept of intensification is critical, as it 
marks the point of connection between the dynamics of memory Stiegler 
expounds in Technics and Time, and the fall in libidinal energy he presents in 
his later work as the determining limit of consumer capitalism. For given that 
the self (conceived as a psychical economy of drives, representations, and 
sublimations) is dispersed across competing regimes of techno-mediatic 
exchange, its power to integrate its desire into the symbolic order of 
recognition (culture) is all but destroyed. And yet the virtual technology that 
constitutes this highly capitalized form of individualism, is also the condition 
on which the experience of spirit, as the work of noesis, can return to the 
collective life of humanity (2013: 89).           
Stiegler’s reading of Freud’s Project for a Scientific Psychology maintains that 
there is an implicit ethic of sublimation that runs through his account of the 
neurological foundation of consciousness: for it is the shaping of the libido 
through its attachment to goals that require the activity of judgement and 
intellect (art, literature, morality, love) that is the foundation of social cathexis 
(Freud, 1954: 389-92). Thus, the subjectivity of human beings is formed 
through sublimation: the individual becomes more than the immediacy of its 
drives through its power to integrate them into the symbolic order of the social 
(Stiegler, 2013: 62). From this Freudian perspective we should regard the 
prosthetic intensification of biological drives as radically disrupting the 
temporal unity of experience: for the possibility of care (for oneself and for 
others) is constantly short-circuited by the urge to consume what is here, now, 
and ready to hand. For Stiegler, there is something unbearable about this life, 
as it is stripped of the relationship to the infinite (the endlessly seductive idea, 
individual, or work of art) that is implicit in the human psychical apparatus. 
This technological disorientation is what marks the return of a certain 
possibility of spirit; for it is in the aporetic relationship between prosthetic 
desire and the discursive economy of ethical life, that the chance of reflexive 
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individuation is given (2013: 70). Thus, if we return to the vocabulary of 
Technics and Time, the crisis of experience that has afflicted Dasein is 
brought to a head by the constant rupturing of its essential temporality: for 
Stiegler, it is only insofar as it reaches an absolute extreme of disorientation 
within the networks of biopolitical capital, that it can give transformative 
expression to its ‘overmortality’ - life as the toxic gregariousness of work, 
sport, sex, and shopping (2013: 76-77; 2009b: 49).   
There is a sense in which the matrix question that has emerged from 
Stiegler’s work concerns the libidinal conflict between two forms of 
messianism: the celebration of universal prosthesis that has become known 
as post-humanism and the rejection of technicity that is embedded in all forms 
of religious fundamentalism (Stiegler, 2013: 106-109). The distribution of this 
conflict is highly complex, as the pharmacological effects of globalization 
(instantaneous connection, plasticity of somatic desire, virtual memory 
supports, digital dementia) have transformed conventional oppositions 
between East and West, Islam and Christianity. The experience of 
disorientation has become endemic in the technological transmission of life, 
and is the central concern of debates about the human soul that are both 
culturally disparate and implicitly cosmopolitan. Thus, there is a sense in 
which it is the encounters between western technocracy and the value 
rapports of Asian cultures (from Islamic fundamentalism to Chinese market 
socialism) that constitute the horizon of Stiegler’s ‘new critique’ of political 
economy (Stiegler, 2013: 89-90). The question of what constitutes a ‘life worth 
living’ is constantly intensified by the contretemps between absolute 
decadence and sacrificial obligation: it becomes a spectre that haunts the 
operational logic of growth and consumption through which the loss libidinal 
energy has reached crisis point in western capitalist societies. If there is to be 
a new cosmopolitanism therefore, this must take the form of a diachronic 
exchange among spiritual ideals that have been distributed and intensified 
through the expansion of global-techno-informatic capitalism. Or, to put it in 
the register Stiegler has developed in his later writings, the present 
catastrophe of speculative capital demands that we work towards an 
‘economy of contribution’ in which labour would be freed from the logic of 
‘ratio’ (the proletarianized infinite of production-consumption-production) to 
become constitutive of a sphere of exchange in which ‘otium’ (the labour of 
spirit) emerges as the global-universal good of prosthetic humanity (2013: 59-
61; 2010: 65-66) 3. For it is only with the constant re-thinking of such a 
transitional space, which is itself pharmacological, that the future of the world 
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End Notes  
                                                
1 It is important to note that Hegel determines a fundamental opposition 
between spirit and technology as early as the System of Ethical Life, where he 
presents ‘the machine’ as the outcome of processes of utilitarian abstraction, 
through which human labour is reduced to restless activity without reflection 
(Hegel, 1979: 116-117).  
 
2 See especially ‘The Mental Diaspora of the Networks’, in The Intelligence of 
Evil, or, the Lucidity Pact. 
 
3 See point 7 of the manifesto of Ars Industrialis, the association for the 
promotion of an industrial politics of spirit that was jointly founded by Stiegler 
(http://arsindustrialis.org/node/1472). 
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